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Abstract
The paper investigates competition in price schedules among vertically diﬀerentiated dupolists. First
order price discrimination is the unique Nash equilibrium of a sequential game in which ﬁrms determine ﬁrst
whether or not to commit to a uniform price, and then simultaneously choose either a single price of a price
schedule. Whether the proﬁts earned by both ﬁrms are larger or smaller under discrimination than under
uniform pricing depends on the quality gap between ﬁrms, and on the disparity of consumer preferences.
Firms engaged in ﬁrst degree discrimination choose quality levels that are optimal from a welfare perspective.
The paper also reﬂects on implications of these ﬁndings for pricing policies of an incumbent threatened by
entry.
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1 Introduction
The literature on price discrimination in a competitive setting has looked primarily at discrimination of
the second and third degree.1 First-degree discrimination has received scant attention. It was viewed as
unworkable, primarily because information about individual reservation prices remained beyond the reach of
sellers. A notable exception arose when ﬁrms sold products that were costly to transport across geographical
space. Because the distance between buyers and sellers was observable, and because it correlated with
transportation cost, one could argue that the maximum price net of transportation that sellers could charge
individual buyers, decreased as the distance separating them from these buyers increased. This explains
why the spatial economics literature was not reluctant to explore pricing regimes akin to ﬁrst degree price
discrimination (Hurter and Lederer, 1985, Lederer and Hurter, 1986, Thisse and Vives, 1988, Hamilton and
Thisse, 1992, Stole, 1995, Ulph and Vulkan, 2000).
Perceptions about the practicality of personalized pricing regimes in non-spatial settings are changing
(Shapiro and Varian, 1999, Varian, 2003). The change accompanies a rapid growth of computer-mediated
transactions. It is attended by advances in information gathering/processing techniques.2 This development
has spawned a literature that explores how on-line sellers exploit information about consumer preferences
via personalization of prices, and product speciﬁcations.(Villas-Boas, 1999, Fudenberg and Tirole, 2000,
Acquisti and Varian, 2001, Varian, 2003).
The personalization of prices requires that sellers’ costs not increase too fast as the number of price
categories expands. On-line technologies are valuable in this regard because they make it easier to cus-
tomize packages in the absence of face-to-face contact with buyers. Also, in some markets - markets of
copyrighted material in particular - standard on-line selling methods are used in conjunction with digital
rights management techniques to curb resales.
The improved capacity to gather, and process information about consumer preferences, also aﬀects pricing
in traditional trading environments. A familiar form of personalized discounting takes place at the check-out
counter when promotional oﬀers are particularized. Banks and insurance companies rely increasingly on the
history of their clients’ activity to mold custom-tailored products.
In markets where know-now is licensed, personalized pricing did not await the emergence of on-line
technologies. Royalties have traditionnally depended on licensees’ intensity of use of the licensed technology.
The reason is that intensity of use correlates with willingness to pay (Farrell and Shapiro, 2004).3 A
related form of discrimination takes place when ﬁrms earn high margins in aftermarkets from the sale of
complementary products whose wear and tear increase with intensity of use.4
This paper examines ﬁrst degree price discrimination by vertically diﬀerentiated duopolists. It addresses
several questions. 1)Does rivalry among duopolists produce a Nash equilibrium in discriminatory price
schedules? 2) If so, does price discrimination perform better in terms of consumer and overall welfare
than uniform pricing? 3)Would ﬁrms engage in discriminatory pricing if they had the power to enforce an
1Although the literature on price discrimination in competitive settings is not as extensive as the analysis for the monopoly
case, it includes a growing number of papers including Katz (1984), Borenstein (1985), Holmes (1989), Corts (1998) and
Armstrong and Vickers(2001). A recent survey by Stole (2003) sums up the current state of knowledge about price discrimination
and imperfect competition.
2In some cases- speciﬁcally the on-line distribution of copyrighted works such as music and software- the actual use of
products by buyers can also be tracked by means of digital rights management techniques.
3Price discrimination in the market for licenses is also facilitated by the fact that licensees cannot legally transfer them to
others.
4See Emch (2003).
2
agreement under which each committed to set a uniform price? 4) How do the quality choices made by
discriminating duopolists measure up in terms of welfare?
Thisse and Vives (1988) show that ﬁrst degree discrimination by horizontally diﬀerentiated duopolists
yields a unique equilibrium in price schedules. They determine that in equilibrium each ﬁrm earns less
than it would earn if both ﬁrms enforced an agreement to price uniformly, and subsequently set prices
independently. This paper is akin to Thisse and Vives (1988). However, in contrast to these authors, it
shows that a prisoner’s dilemma need not arise when diﬀerentiation is vertical. Whether it does, depends on
the gap in the qualities oﬀered by the two ﬁrms, and on the disparity of consumer preferences with respect
to quality. A transition from uniform to discriminatory pricing aﬀects proﬁts via two channels: An enhanced
capacity to extract surplus from some buyers, and an intensiﬁcation of competition to obtain the patronage
of other buyers. 5
Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 characterizes the unique equilibrium that emerges from the
simultaneous choice of price schedules. It shows that prices are not monotonic in consumers’ willingness
to pay, and explains why competition in discriminatory price schedules yields a welfare maximizing market
coverage, and a welfare maximizing partition of the market into buyers of high and low quality. In contrast
to most of the literature, the paper derives this result - as well as other results - for a general distribution
of consumer preferences. Section 4 takes up the question whether discrimination by both ﬁrms is an equilib-
rium strategy when the pricing regime is endogeneous. Section 5 shows that a prior commitment by both
ﬁrms to uniform pricing does not always enhance their proﬁts. It explains under what conditions it does.
Section 6 endogenizes the choice of quality. It establishes that proﬁt maximizing duopolists who engage in
discriminatory pricing choose qualities that maximize welfare. Section 7 provides concluding remarks and
adresses some policy issues.
2 The model
We consider a market in which two ﬁrms serve a continuum of consumers. The size of the market is normalized
to one. Each ﬁrm produces a single variety of a vertically diﬀerentiated product. For convenience we call
the varieties ”high quality” and ”low quality ”, and denote them sH and sL, where sH > sL > 0. We call
the producers of these qualities the high (H), and the low (L) quality ﬁrm.
There is a continuum of consumers with Mussa-Rosen (1978) preferences. Each consumer is identiﬁed by
a taste parameter θ. The latter is distributed with positive density f(θ) over the interval [0, b] . A consumer
buys a single one unit of high or low quality, or nothing at all. The willingness to pay by consumer θ for a
unit product of quality si is θsi (i ∈ {H,L}). The consumer who pays pi(θ) for such unit gets a surplus
θsi − pi(θ). The consumer who does not purchase has zero surplus. Consumers cannot resell.
Firms observe the θ′s of all consumers. This fact is common knowledge. The cost of producing qi units
of quality si is C(si, qi) = c(si)qi where c(si) denotes the unit cost of quality si. Firms incur no costs besides
production cost. Unit cost c(s) is a diﬀerentiable function, strictly increasing and strictly convex in quality.
Speciﬁcally,
c(0) = 0, c
′
(s) > 0, c′′(s) > 0,∀s > 0 (1)
Conditions (1) imply that the ranking of cost/quality ratios is
0 <
c(sL)
sL
<
c(sH)
sH
<
c(sH)− c(sL)
sH − sL , ∀sH > sL > 0 (2)
5See Thisse and Vives (1988) and Ulph and Vulkan (2000, 2001). Ulph and Vulkan (2000) ﬁnd that a switch from uniform
to discriminatory pricing boosts proﬁts when transport cost increases rapidly with distance.
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Because we focus on the choices between pricing regimes, we want both ﬁrms to be active under all the
regimes that we consider. Condition (3) below insures such outcome.
b >
c(sH)− c(sL)
sH − sL , ∀sH > sL > 0 (3)
We deﬁne a price schedule as a function pi(.) that speciﬁes the price pi(θ) at which ﬁrm i is willing to sell
one unit of quality si to consumer θ. We say that a price schedule is admissible when all prices that make
up the schedule are at least as high as unit cost, and not higher than the reservation price of the consumers
they target. The strategy set of ﬁrm i is deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition: The set Σi of admissible price schedules for ﬁrm i (i ∈ {H,L}) is Σi = {pi(.)/pi(.) is a
continuous and bounded real function deﬁned on [0, b] such that, ∀θ ∈ [0, b] , c(si) ≤ pi(θ) ≤ θsi}.
This restriction of the strategy space means that we do not allow a ﬁrm to make up a loss incurred in
one market segment by a proﬁt earned in another segment.
We consider two admissible price schedules; the uniform schedule and the discriminating schedule. We
say that a price schedule is uniform when a single price targets all consumers. We say that a schedule
is discriminatory or personalized, when its component prices vary according to the taste parameter of the
consumers they target.
We examine four regimes. Under the uniform regime, denoted (UH , UL), both ﬁrms choose uniform
schedules. Under the discriminatory regime, denoted (DH , DL), both ﬁrms choose discriminatory schedules.
The remaining regimes, called mixed are denoted (UH , DL) and (DH , UL). They occur when one ﬁrm sets
a uniform price and the other ﬁrm discriminates..
3 Discriminatory price schedules: regime (DH , DL)
For any pair of admissible schedules (pH(.), pL(.))∈ ΣH ×ΣL, the market areas served by ﬁrms H and L are:
ΘH(pH(.), pL(.)) = {θ ∈ [0, b]/θsH − pH(θ) ≥Max[0, θsL − pL(θ)]} (4)
ΘL(pH(.), pL(.)) = {θ ∈ [0, b]/θsL − pL(θ) ≥Max[0, θsH − pH(θ)]} (5)
The proﬁts of ﬁrm i (i = {H,L}) are :
Πi(pH(.), pL(.)) =
∫
Θi(pH(.),pL(.))
[pi(θ)− c(si)]f(θ)dθ (6)
Proposition 1 below characterizes the Nash equilibrium of the pricing game Γ in which the ﬁrms with
proﬁt functions deﬁned by (4), (5) and (6) simultaneously choose admissible price schedules within the spaces
ΣH and ΣL.
To characterize the equilibrium, we use the following terms. We say that ﬁrm i has a monopoly position
with respect to consumer θ if, for any admissible price schedule chosen by its rival j, it can attract that
consumer with a price θsi that leaves zero surplus to that consumer. We say that ﬁrm i has a cost-quality
advantage over it’s rival j with respect to consumer θ if there exists an admissible price pi(θ) at which it can
attract that consumer when the rival ﬁrm j targets that consumer with a price equal to its unit cost c(sj).
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Clearly, a ﬁrm that holds a monopoly position vis-a-vis a consumer also holds a cost-quality advantage with
respect to that consumer. 6
.
Proposition 1 The unique Nash equilibrium of the pricing game Γ with strategy sets Σi and payoﬀs Πi
(i ∈ {H,L}) deﬁned by (6) is the pair of price schedules (p∗H(θ), p∗L(θ)) deﬁned by (7) and (8) below
p∗H(θ) =
{
c(sL) + θ(sH − sL) if c(sH)−c(sL)sH−sL ≤ θ ≤ b
c(sH) if 0 ≤ θ ≤ c(sH)−c(sL)sH−sL
(7)
p∗L(θ) =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
c(sL) if
c(sH)−c(sL)
sH−sL ≤ θ ≤ b
c(sH)− θ(sH − sL) if c(sH)sH ≤ θ <
c(sH)−c(sL)
sH−sL
θsL if 0 ≤ θ ≤ c(sH)sH
(8)
Proof :
Existence.
Because the price targeted at one consumer does not constrain the price targeted at another consumer,
and because marginal cost does not depend on quantity, competition in price schedules adds up to a collection
of Bertrand games for individual consumers. Therefore, it is suﬃcient to show the following:
i/ For each θ ∈ [0, b] , p∗H(θ) maximizes ΠH(pH(θ), p∗L(θ)) over pH(θ) ∈ ΣH , given the price p∗L(θ) ;
ii/ for each θ ∈ [0, b] , p∗L(θ) maximizes ΠL(p∗H(θ), pL(θ)) over pL(θ) ∈ ΣL, given the price p∗H(θ).
We examine the equilibrium in four market segments using the simpliﬁed notation cH for c(sH) and cL
for c(sL).
1. θ ∈
[
cH−cL
sH−sL , b
]
When p∗L(θ) = cL consumers derive positive surplus from purchasing low quality. The highest price at
which consumers purchase high quality satisﬁes θsH − p∗H(θ) = θsL − cL which implies (7). This price
is admissible because the unit cost function is convex.7 With respect to consumers in this interval, ﬁrm
H has a cost quality advantage over ﬁrm L, but enjoys no monopoly position .8 When the H-ﬁrm sets
p∗H(θ) = cL + θ(sH − sL), consumers purchase low quality only if it is priced lower than unit cost. Because
this is not admissible, p∗L(θ) = cL is an optimal response by ﬁrm L.
2. θ ∈ [ cHsH , cH−cLsH−sL [
When p∗L(θ) = cH − θ(sH − sL) consumers in the interval get a surplus θsH − cH from low quality. Firm
H can attract these consumers only if it prices below unit cost. Because this is not admissible, the best
response of ﬁrm H is to target these consumers with a price equal to cH . When p∗H(θ) = cH , the highest
price at which ﬁrm L can attract consumers satisﬁes the condition θsL − p∗L(θ) = θsH − cH which implies
6The converse is not true. Consumers with respect to whom neither ﬁrm holds an advantage have θ =
c(sH)−c(sL)
sH−sL . The
low quality ﬁrm holds a cost-quality advantage or a monopoly position for consumers with a lesser taste for quality; the high
quality ﬁrm holds a cost-quality advantage for consumers with stronger preference for quality.
7For the singleton θ = cH−cL
sH−sL , there does not exist an admissible price schedule pH(θ) that makes the consumer who
purchases high quality strictly better oﬀ. But, for all other consumers belonging to the interval ] cH−cL
sH−sL , b], there exists an
admissible price schedule deﬁned by pH(θ) = p
∗
H(θ)− , where  is a positive and suﬃciently small, such that consumers θ are
strictly better oﬀ by purchasing high quality.
8Note that θ ∈
[
cH−cL
sH−sL , b
]
=⇒ cL + θ(sH − sL) < θsH . Therefore ﬁrm H does not hold a monopoly position over such
consumer.
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(7). Clearly, ﬁrm L has a cost-quality advantage but no monopoly position with respect to consumers in the
interval.
3. θ ∈ [ cLsL , cHsH [.
Consumers would derive negative surplus from high quality even if they purchased such quality at unit
cost. Firm L holds a monopoly position over consumers in the interval. It therefore sets pL(θ) = θsL
capturing their entire consumer surplus. pH(θ) = cH is a best response by ﬁrm H because it can sell only
by pricing below unit cost.
4. θ ∈ [0, cLsL [
Within this interval no ﬁrm can attract consumers by pricing above unit cost. Therefore both ﬁrms set
price at unit cost and neither sells any output.
Uniqueness.
We have already indicated that the admissibility restriction, and the assumption that cost is linear
in quantity imply that the component parts of the equilibrium price schedules are the solutions Bertrand
competition games for individual consumers.9 Because, the latter are unique, the equilibium price schedules
are unique as well.
Figure 1 displays the equilibrium. The lines labeled θsH and θsL represent the participation constraints
of high and low quality buyers. The line segment KM is the self-selection constraint faced by the high quality
ﬁrm when its rival sells at unit cost. Similarly, the line segment TL represents the self-selection constraint
faced by the low quality ﬁrm when its rival oﬀers high quality at unit cost. The high quality ﬁrm serves the
market segment [ cH−cLsH−sL , b] setting prices represented by KM . The low quality ﬁrm divides its buyers in two
segements. With respect to consumers having θ ∈ [ cLsL , cHsH ], it acts as a perfectly discriminating monopolist
setting prices at which the participation constraint is binding (V T in Figure 1). With respect to consumers
with θ ∈] cHsH , cH−cLsH−sL ], the low quality ﬁrm sets prices at which the consumers’ self-selection constraint binds
(TL in Figure 1). The ﬁrm cannot extract all the surplus from these consumers because they are ready to
switch to high quality when the latter is priced at unit cost.
9For each θ ∈ [0, b], the corresponding θ-game, denoted Γθ, is deﬁned as follows. The strategy space of player i (i ∈ {H,L})
in Γθ is the set of prices p
θ
i belonging to the interval [ci, θsi]. The player i’s payoﬀ in Γθ is given by
πθi (p
θ
i , p
θ
j ) =
{
pθi − ci if θsi − pθi ≥ max(0, θsj − pθj )
0 if θsi − pθi < max(0, θsj − pθj )
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Substitution of (7) and (8) into (6) yields the equilibrium proﬁts
ΠH(DH , DL) =
∫ b
cH−cL
sH−sL
[cL + θ(sH − sL)− cH ]f(θ)dθ (9)
and
ΠL(DH , DL) =
∫ cH
sH
cL
sL
[θsL − cL]f(θ)dθ +
∫ cH−cL
sH−sL
cH
sH
[cH − θ(sH − sL)− cL]f(θ)dθ(10)
In Figure 1, the proﬁt earned by the high quality ﬁrm from an individual consumer is shown by the
vertical distance between the line segment KM and the horizontal line cH . Because the total proﬁt is a
weighted sum of these distances on the segment
[
cH−cL
sH−sL , b
]
we write ΠH(DH , DL) = area KMI, keeping
in mind that the area is properly deﬁned by the integral (9). Similarly we write ΠL(DH , DL) = area V TL
We now note that Proposition 1 implies:
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Fig 1 : Regime (DH, DL)
Corollary 2 Competition in price schedules by quality diﬀerentiated duopolists yields a market coverage and
a segmentation of consumers into high and low quality buyers that maximize welfare
Proof:
Welfare is maximized when the following conditions hold: 1) Low quality is sold only to consumers whose
willingness to pay is larger than the cost of producing low quality, and whose a surplus from low quality
purchased at cost is larger than their surplus from high quality purchased at cost; 2) high quality is sold
only to consumers whose surplus from high quality purchased at cost is larger than their surplus from low
quality purchased at cost. These conditions are clearly met when the duopolists choose the schedules given
by (7) and (8).
4 Selecting a price policy.
We now address the question whether price discrimination is an equilibrium of a game in which each ﬁrm
can commit to a uniform schedule before the rival producer sets a price or a price schedule. We do so by
considering a two-stage game. In the ﬁrst stage, each ﬁrm chooses whether or not to commit to a uniform
price. If the two ﬁrms commit to a uniform price - regime (UH , UL) - both set the price they committed
to at the second stage. If no ﬁrm commits - regime (DH , DL) - each is free to choose an admissible price
schedule in the second stage. If one ﬁrm commits and the other does not - regimes (UH , DL) and (DH , UL)
- only the ﬁrm that did not commit remains free to choose among admissible price schedules at stage 2. 10
Consumers make their purchasing decisions at the second stage.
Committing to a uniform price at stage 1 limits one’s freedom at stage 2. Therefore, committing can
only be rational if it elicits a pricing response on the part of the rival that is favorable to the ﬁrm that
makes the commitment. The credibility of a commitment to price uniformly can have diﬀerent sources. It
may derive from sunk investments in a distribution channel that puts intermediaries between manufacturers
and consumers, and does not allow the former to ascertain individual preferences. It can arise from a most-
favored-customer clause granted by the seller. It may also be based on reputational losses that would ensue
from backing down on a pre-announced uniform price.
We assume that ﬁrms which commit to a uniform price take measures that lend credibility to that
commitment. However, we do not model these measures.
We look ﬁrst at price equilibria that emerge when one ﬁrm commits and the other does not.
4.1 The H-ﬁrm commits and the L-ﬁrm does not: regime (UH , DL)
Because the high quality ﬁrm eans zero proﬁts when pH = cH , we restrict our attention to commitments
where pH > cH . The best response of ﬁrm L to such commitment is
10We show in appendix 1 that there does not exist a Nash equilibrium of a simultaneous game in pure strategies where the
high quality ﬁrm commits to a uniform price and the low quality ﬁrm price discriminates.
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pL(θ, pH) =
⎧⎨⎩
cL for θ ≥ pH−cLsH−sL
pH − θ(sH − sL) for pHsH < θ <
pH−cL
sH−sL
θsL for
cL
sL
≤ θ ≤ pHsH
(11)
Proﬁts are
ΠL(pH , pL(.)) =
∫ pH
sH
cL
sL
[θsL − cL]f(θ)dθ +
∫ pH−cL
sH−sL
pH
sH
[pH − θ(sH − sL)− cL]f(θ)dθ (12)
ΠH(pH , pL(., pH)) =
∫ b
pH−cL
sH−sL
[pH − cH ]f(θ)dθ (13)
Referring to Figure 2 and using the same notation as above we write ΠL(pH , pL(.)) = area V AB and
ΠH(pH , pL(., pH)) = area FGIN .
Because cLsL <
cH
sH
< cH−cLsH−sL <
pH−cL
sH−sL , it must be true that V TL ⊂ V AB, or area V TL = ΠL(DH , DL) <
area V AB = ΠL(pH , pL(.)). Thus, the low quality ﬁrm earns higher proﬁts when it does not commit and
its rival commits to any uniform price pH > cH , than when no ﬁrm commits. Because cH−cLsH−sL <
pH−cL
sH−sL < b,
it must be true that FGIN ⊂ KMI or area FGIN = ΠH(pH , pL(., pH)) < area KMI = ΠH(DH , DL).
We therefore conclude that the high quality ﬁrm which commits to any uniform price pH > cH , while its
rival does not commit, earns less than when no ﬁrm commits.
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Fig 2 : Regime (UH, DL)
Upon deﬁning p˜H = argmaxΠH(pH , pL(., pH)), we can write ΠH(UH , DL) ≡ ΠH(p˜H , pL(., p˜H)) and
ΠL(UH , DL) ≡ ΠL(p˜H , pL(., p˜H)) with pL(θ, p˜H) given by (11). Because the condition ΠH(pH , pL(., pH)) <
ΠH(DH , DL) holds true for any pH > cH it holds true for p˜H as well. Therefore:
ΠH(UH , DL) < ΠH(DH , DL) (14)
and
ΠL(UH , DL) > ΠL(DH , DL) (15)
Figure 2 clariﬁes the diﬀerences between the (UH , DL) and (DH , DL) regimes: i) Commitment by ﬁrm
H to a uniform price pH > cH shifts the self-selection constraint faced by the low quality ﬁrm upward (from
TL to AB) and shortens the self-selection constraint faced by the high quality ﬁrm (from KM to FM); ii)
the market coverage is the same under the two regimes, but under the (UH , DL) regime the market segment
served by the high quality ﬁrm is smaller, and that served by the low quality ﬁrm larger than under the
(DH , DL) regime11; iii)the number of low quality buyers that retain no surplus is larger under the (UH , DL)
regime than under the (DH , DL) regime.
4.2 The L-ﬁrm commits and the H-ﬁrm does not: regime (DH , UL)
When the low quality ﬁrm commits to a uniform price pL ∈( cL, cH) the best response of the high quality
producer is
pH(θ, pL) =
{
pL + θ(sH − sL) for θ ∈ [ cH−pLsH−sL , b]
cH for θ <
cH−pL
sH−sL
(16)
The proﬁts of the high and low quality ﬁrms are
ΠH(pH(., pL), pL) =
∫ b
cH−pL
sH−sL
[pL + θ(sH − sL)− cH ]f(θ)dθ (17)
and
ΠL(pH(., pL), pL) =
∫ cH−pL
sH−sL
pL
sL
(pL − cL) f (θ) dθ (18)
Note that (18) assumes pLsL <
cH−pL
sH−sL which is equivalent to
sL
pL
> sHcH .This condition must be satisﬁed if
the low quality ﬁrm is to remain active.
Figure 3 displays the proﬁts as area CDBQ for ΠL(pH(., pL), pL), and area ERI for ΠH(pH(., pL), pL).
Because cH−pLsH−sL <
cH−cL
sH−sL < b, we have KMI ⊂ ERI. We conclude that when the high quality ﬁrm does not
11What brings about this result is that the ﬁrm committing to the uniform price has no interest in competing agressively for
consumers who are indiﬀerent between the two quelities when each is priced at unit cost. The reason is that the ﬁrm would
have to accept a lower margin on sales to consumers with a strong preference for its quality.
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commit, it earns higher proﬁts when it faces a low quality ﬁrm that commits to a uniform price pL, than
when it faces a low quality ﬁrm that does not commit. Similarly, because cLsL <
pL
sL
< cHsL <
cH−pL
sH−sL <
cH−cL
sH−sL ,
we have CDBQ ⊂ V TL. We conclude that when the high quality ﬁrm does not commit, the low quality
ﬁrm earns lower proﬁts by commiting to a uniform price, than by not committing.
Upon deﬁning p˜L = arg max
cL<pL<
sL
sH
cH
ΠL(pH(., pL), pL) we can write ΠL(DH , UL) ≡ ΠL(pH(., p˜L), p˜L)
and ΠH(DH , UL) ≡ ΠH(pH(., p˜L), p˜L), where pH(θ, p˜L) is given by (16). Because the inequalities ΠH(pH(., pL), pL) >
ΠH(DH , DL) and ΠL(pH(., pL), pL) < ΠL(DH , DL) hold true for all pL, they hold true for p˜L ∈( cL, sLsH cH)
as well. Therefore,
ΠL(DH , UL) < ΠL(DH , DL)(19)
and
ΠH(DH , UL) > ΠH(DH , DL) (20)
Figure 3 facilitates a comparison of the outcomes under the (DH , UL) and the (DH , DL) regimes. Seg-
ment ER is the best price response of the high quality ﬁrm. It also represents the self-selection constraint
confronted by the high quality ﬁrm when the low quality ﬁrm chooses a uniform price pL ∈
(
cL,
sL
sH
cL
)
. All
consumers with θ ∈
[
cH−pL
sH−sL , b
]
purchase high quality and keep the same surplus they would retain if they
purchased low quality at the price pL. The segment CD is served by the low quality ﬁrm.
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Fig 3 : Regime (DH, UL)
The following diﬀerences between regimes are apparent: i) Commitment by ﬁrm L to a uniform price
shifts the self-selection constraint faced by high quality ﬁrm upward (KM becomes ER) and it changes
the self-selection constraint faced by the low quality ﬁrm (V TL becomes CD); ii) total market coverage
is smaller under the (DH ,UL) regime than under the (DH , DL) regime; iii) the segment served by the low
quality ﬁrm is also smaller under the (DH , UL) regime (CD instead of V L), whereas the segment served by
the high quality producer is larger (EI instead of KI).
Jointly (14) and (19) imply
Proposition 3 Personalization of prices is a Nash equilibrium of a sequential game in which vertically
diﬀerentiated duopolists determine whether or not to commit to a speciﬁc uniform price before they actually
set prices and sell output.
We now show that when the distribution of consumer preferences is uniform over [0, b] , the equilibrium
is supported by a dominant strategy for each ﬁrm, and is therefore unique.
5 A prisoner’s dilemma?
Our ﬁnding that price personalization constitutes a Nash equilibrium is the counterpart for vertical dif-
ferentaition of an earlier result by Thisse and Vives (1998) for the case spatial diﬀerentiation. Spatially
separated duopolists always face a prisoner’s dilemma; both would be better oﬀ if they could enforce an
agreement to set uniform prices. We show that this is not true is in the case of quality diﬀerentiation. We
do so for the particular case where the distribution of consumer preferences is uniform.
Table 1 displays the proﬁts of the high and low quality ﬁrms for each of the four pricing regimes when
f(.) is uniform.12
DL UL
DH
ΠH = sH−sL2b [b− cH−cLsH−sL ]2
ΠL = sL2b [
cH−cL
sH−sL − cLsL ][ cHsH − cLsL ]
ΠH = sH−sL2b [b− 12 ( cH−cLsH−sL + cHsH )]2
ΠL = sL4b [
cH
sH
− cLsL ][ cH−cLsH−sL − cLsL ]
UH
ΠH = sH−sL4b [b− cH−cLsH−sL ]2
ΠL = 12b
sL(sH−sL)
sH
[ 12 (b +
cH−cL
sH−sL )− cLsL ]2
ΠH =
4s2H(sH−sL)
(4sH−sL)2b [b− 12 ( cH−cLsH−sL + cHsH )]2
ΠL =
4sLsH(sH−sL)
(4sH−sL)2b [
1
2 (b +
cH−cL
sH−sL )− cLsL )]2
Table 1: Equilibrium proﬁts for a uniform distribution of preferences over [0, b].
12Appendix 4 gives the derivation the proﬁts shown in Table 1.
12
We note that when one ﬁrm discriminates, the proﬁts earned by the rival ﬁrm are twice as large when it
also discriminates than when it does not. Using 0 < sL < sH , we obtain 14 <
4s2H
(4sH−sL)2 <
4
9 which entails
ΠH(DH , UL) > ΠH(UH , UL), and ΠL(UH , DL) > ΠL(UH , UL). The latter implies that when the distribution
of preferences is uniform, price discrimination is a dominant strategy for both ﬁrms.
To show under what circumstances a prisoner’s dilemma arises we start with the proof of an intermediate
result.
Lemma There exist two threshold values bL (sH , sL) and bH (sH , sL), each larger than cH−cLsH−sL , such
that
sign [ΠH(UH , UL)−ΠH(DH , DL)] = sign [bH − b]
sign [ΠL(UH , UL)−ΠL(DH , DL)] = sign [b− bL]
Proof : See appendix 2.
Existence of a prisoner’s dilemma requires bL < bH and b ∈]bL, bH [. The following proposition states
when these conditions are met.
Proposition 4 Both ﬁrms earn higher proﬁts when they simultaneously set uniform prices than when they si-
multaneously choose discriminatory price schedules, if and only if, sH < 3.17sL and b ∈ (bL(sH , sL), bH(sH , sL))
where bL(sH , sL) and bH(sH , sL) are deﬁned by Πj(DH , DL)−Πj(UH , UL) = 0 and j ∈ {L,H}.
Proof : See appendix 3
The intuition behind this result is clear. The duopolists compete for consumers who, loosely speaking,
can be divided into two classes. One class is made up of consumers we can call ”captive” because they derive
far greater surplus from one of the qualities when the both qualities are priced at unit cost. The other class
is made up of ”non-captive” consumers. Their surplus is not very diﬀerent across qualities when each quality
is priced at unit cost.
For very large values of b, the portion of customers that is captive to the high quality ﬁrm is large
compared to the portion of consumers that is not captive to that ﬁrm. Discrimination allows the high
quality ﬁrm to extract a large amount of surplus from the class that has a strong preference for its quality.
Therefore, the ﬁrm earns more when it discriminates than when it does not. For somewhat lower values
of b, the high quality ﬁrm lacks this opportunity. Also, for lower b′s the low quality producer is also
better oﬀ under uniform pricing because such pricing elicits less agressive pricing by the rival ﬁrm. As b
decreases further, discrimination becomes the preferred option for the low quality ﬁrm. The reason is that
discrimination allows greater extraction of surplus from consumers with a low willingness to pay, and entails
less of a sacriﬁce in terms of proﬁts from sales to non-captive consumers. The latter is due to the fact that
the optimally chosen uniform prices of both ﬁrms fall when b decreases. Therefore, the low quality ﬁrm is
better oﬀ when it discriminates and draws proﬁts (almost) exclusively from its captive consumers.
The proposition also states that an agreement to price uniformly makes the duopolists better oﬀ only
when the quality gap is below a certain threshold. The reason is that a small quality gap -all else equal-
reduces the portion of captive consumers
The following corollary compares the aggregate consumer surplus under the (DH , DL) and (UH , UL)
regime
.
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Corollary: When the conditions insuring the existence of a prisonner’s dilemma are met, aggregate
consumer surplus is higher when ﬁrms engage in personalized pricing than when they price uniformly.
Proof: The proof follows from the deﬁnition of aggregate welfare, and from the earlier result that aggregate
welfare is maximized when the two ﬁrms choose proﬁt-maximizing discriminatory price schedules.
6 Quality choice by discriminating duopolists.
We now endogenize product speciﬁcation and address the question how qualities selected by vertically dif-
ferentiated duopolists compare to welfare maximizing qualities. For this purpose, we add one more stage to
the game - an initial stage at which both ﬁrms simultaneously choose their quality in a bounded interval
[0, S] .13 The subsequent stages are identical to the pricing game studied in the earlier sections.14.
Because price discrimination is an equilibrium for all values sH > sL > 0, a Nash equilibrium in qualities
must satisfy the ﬁrst order conditions (21) and (22) below, obtained by diﬀerentiating (9) and (10) with
respect to sH and sL 15
∫ b
c(sH )−c(sL)
sH−sL
[θ − c′ (sH)] f(θ)dθ = 0 (21)
∫ c(sH )−c(sL)
sH−sL
c(sL)
sL
[θ − c′ (sL)] f(θ)dθ = 0 (22)
Conditions (21) and (22) simply state that a pair of qualities constitutes a Nash equilibrium when a
small change in either quality aﬀects unit cost by as much as it aﬀects the willingness to pay by the average
consumer purchasing that quality.16We now turn to the welfare analysis.
Proposition 5 Vertically diﬀerentiated single-product duopolists who engage in perfect price discrimination
choose socially optimal qualities.
Proof : The proof is straightforward. One shows that the qualities selected by a welfare maximizing ﬁrm
that produces two qualities are the same as the equilibrium qualities that satisfy conditions (21) and (22).
Total welfare is
W (sH , sL) =
∫ c(sH )−c(sL)
sH−sL
c(sL)
sL
(θsL − c(sL))f (θ) dθ +
∫ b
c(sH )−c(sL)
sH−sL
(θsH − c(sH))f (θ) dθ (23)
13S is the highest quality allowed by technology.
14Because we know that regardless of quality the equilibrium pricing strategy entailss discrimination by both ﬁrms, we
conclude that the Nash equilibrium in qualities is obtained from maximization of proﬁts under discriminatory pricing.
15Convexity of the unit cost function implies that the second order conditions are satisﬁed.
16For a uniform density we have c′(s∗H) =
1
2
[
c(s∗H )−c(s∗L)
s∗
H
−s∗
L
+ b] and c′(s∗L) =
1
2
[
c(s∗H )−c(s∗L)
s∗
H
−s∗
L
+
c(s∗L)
s∗
L
].
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Diﬀerentiation of (23) with respect to sH , yields the ﬁrst order condition
[
c(sH)− c(sL)
sH − sL sL − c(sL)
]
f
(
c(sH)− c(sL)
sH − sL
)
∂[ c(sH)−c(sL)sH−sL ]
∂sH
+
∫ c(sH )−c(sL)
sH−sL
c(sL)
sL
[θ − c′ (sH)] f(θ)d (θ)
−
[
c(sH)− c(sL)
sH − sL sH − c(sH)
]
f
(
c(sH)− c(sL)
sH − sL
)
∂[ c(sH)−c(sL)sH−sL ]
∂sH
= 0
which simpliﬁes to (21).
Similarly, diﬀerentiation of (23) with respect to sL yields the ﬁrst order condition
cH−cL
sH−sL∫
cL
sL
[θ − c′ (sL)] f (θ) dθ
+
[
c(sH)− c(sL)
sH − sL sL − c(sL)
]
f
(
c(sH)− c(sL)
sH − sL
)
∂[ c(sH)−c(sL)sH−sL ]
∂sL
−
[
c(sL)
sL
sL − c(sL)
]
f
(
c(sL)
sL
)
c(sL)
sL
∂[ c(sL)sL ]
∂sL
−
[
c(sH)− c(sL)
sH − sL sH − c(sH)
]
f
(
c(sH)− c(sL)
sH − sL
)
∂[ c(sH)−c(sL)sH−sL ]
∂sL
= 0
which simpliﬁes to (22). This completes the proof.
7 Final Remarks
We have shown that ﬁrst order price discrimination is a Nash equilibrium of a game where quality diﬀeren-
tiated duopolists determine ﬁrst whether or not to commit to a uniform price, and subsequently set prices
and sell output. The building blocks of competition in price schedules are Bertrand games for individual
consumers. This follows from the assumption that the prices targeted at diﬀerent consumers can be chosen
independently.
Whether speciﬁc consumers are better oﬀ under discrimination than under uniform pricing depends on
the extent to which they are captive to one of the sellers. Discrimination beneﬁts the consumers whose
preference for one of the qualities is weak when both qualities are priced at unit cost. With respect to
these consumers, the competition eﬀect of discrimination outweighs the enhanced surplus extraction eﬀect.
Consumers who have a strong preference for one of the qualities when both are priced at unit cost, are worse
oﬀ under discrimination.
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In contrast to earlier contributions that looked at horizontal diﬀerentiation, we ﬁnd that quality diﬀeren-
tiated duopolists are not necessarily better oﬀ when they enforce an agreement to price uniformly. Whether
they are, depends on the disparity in qualities produced by the rival ﬁrm. A necessary condition for both
ﬁrms to be better oﬀ under ﬁrst degree price discrimination is that the disparity in qualities be suﬃciently
large. We also establishe that for all possible quality combinations, a unilateral move by one ﬁrm from
uniform pricing to personalized pricing lowers the rival’s proﬁts.
The industrial organization literature has shown that a unilateral grant of a most-favored customer clause
can increase the proﬁts of all ﬁrms in an industry by softening price competition. Our paper shows that
the assumption of uniform pricing is critical to this outcome. In the absence of a commitment to uniform
pricing, a unilateral grant of price protection to one’s customers is always harmful to the party making such
grant.
We have also shown that for any exogenously given quality pair, competition in discriminatory prices
schedules yields a welfare maximizing coverage of the market, and a welfare maximizing segmentation into
buyers of high and low quality. Furthermore, when ﬁrms simultaneously and independently decide on a
quality before selecting a price policy, both choose welfare maximizing qualities.
We obtain these results are obtained for a fairly general cost function.The presence of a ﬁxed cost does
not change the basic result that personalized pricing is a Nash equilibrium.
One policy implication of the paper is that imposing a minimum quality requirement lowers aggregate
welfare when pricing is discriminatory. This is in contrast to earlier results which show that a mildly
restrictive quality standard raises welfare when it narrows the quality gap between ﬁrms (Ronnen, 1991,
Crampes and Hollander, 1995). Under uniform pricing, a minimum quality requirement increases market
coverage when the narrowing of the quality gap that ensues, leads to a suﬃcient intensiﬁcation of price
competition. Such intensiﬁcation also takes place when the ﬁrms engage in price discrimination. The reason
is that a narrowing of the quality gap enlarges the range of non-captive consumers. However, when pricing
is discriminatory, a minimum quality requirement always restricts market coverage. More importantly, the
paper suggests that a narrowing of the quality gap gives ﬁrms an incentive to choose distribution channels or
contractual arrangements that assure uniform prices. When this happens, the result is a further reduction
of market coverage, and a suboptimal segmentation of consumers into high and low quality buyers.
The industrial organization literature has devoted much attention to the question how market structure
aﬀects the price level. This paper raises the question how market structure aﬀects the choice of a price
policy. Entry for example, may reduce the disparity in qualities oﬀered by diﬀerent producers. Th paper
explains why the latter aﬀects ﬁrms’ incentives to reach an agreement to price uniformly.
Although the paper looks at competition among active ﬁrms, it points to interesting questions in regard
to pricing by an incumbent who faces a threat of entry. The standard reply to the question what diﬀerentiates
an incumbent from an entrant is that the former can credibly commit to a post-entry course of action before
the second ﬁrm appears on stage. Another distinguishing characteristic between an incumbent and an
entrant is that the former is better equipped to engage in diﬀerential pricing. Indeed, pre-entry adoption of
discriminatory pricing by an incumbent reveals information about buyers’ reservation prices that the entrant
does not posses. The implication is that the entrant is more likely - at least initially - to set a uniform price,
or perhaps divide consumers into fewer classes for pricing purposes than the incumbent.
The paper has shown that a ﬁrm which prices uniformly earns lower proﬁts when its rival discriminates
that when it does not. This suggests than an incumbent who discriminates is more likely to deter entry than
an incumbent who prices uniformly 17.
The assumption that ﬁrms posses full information about individual reservation prices, and that the in-
17See Aguirre et al., 1998.
16
formation they do posses is acquired no cost, obviously lacks realism (Varian, 2003). Information about
consumer preferences can be obtained, in part at least, from experimentation with various prices. Such
experimention carries a cost (Caminal and Matutes, 1990, Shaﬀer and Zhang, 2000). However, when ex-
perimentation takes place prior to entry that cost may be largely sunk when the second ﬁrm is ready to
enter.
It is clear that discrimination prior to entry does not compel an incumbent to discriminate post entry.
However, it makes post-entry discrimination more likely because the incumbent already possesses information
about individual reservation prices, and - as shown in the paper- the ﬁrm which has costless information
about reservation prices, earns higher proﬁts when it discriminates than when it does not, regardless of the
policy adopted by the rival producer. This suggests that a ﬁrm threatened by entry might decide to incur a
non-recoupable cost of acquiring information about individual reservation prices even though it would not
do so in the absence of such threat.
17
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Appendix 1: Non-existence of an equilibrium where DL and UH are chosen simultaneously.
Proposition 6 The one-period game where the high quality ﬁrm sets a uniform price and the low quality
ﬁrm personalizes prices does not have an equilibrium in pure strategies.
Proof: We restrict the proof to the case where f(θ) = 1b∀ ∈ [0, b] . We already know that for a uniform
price pH ≥ cH the best response of the low quality ﬁrm is given by:
pL(θ, pH) =
⎧⎨⎩
θsL for
cL
sL
≤ θ ≤ pHsH
pH − θ(sH − sL) for pHsH < θ ≤
pH−cL
sH−sL
cL for
pH−cL
sH−sL < θ ≤ b
The proﬁt of the high quality ﬁrm is teherefore
ΠH(pH , pL(., pH)) =
1
b
(pH − cH)(b− pH − cL
sH − sL )
We show ﬁrst that a pair (pH , pL(θ, pH)) where pH > cH cannot be an equilibrium. Assume that
pH > cH and consider a deviation by ﬁrm H lowering its price to p˜H = pH −  where 0 <  < pH − cH .
Consumers with θ ∈ ]pHsH ,
pH−cL
sH−sL ] switch to the high quality because θsH − pH +  > θsL − pH + θ(sH − sL).
Post deviation, the proﬁt of the high quality ﬁrm is Π˜H = 1b (p˜H − cH)(b − p˜HsH ). Therefore, Π˜H − ΠH =
1
b [−(b− p˜HsH )+(pH − cH)(
pH−cL
sH−sL −
p˜H
sH
)]. Because the second term on the right hand side can be made larger
in absolute value than the ﬁrst term, the deviation increases the proﬁts of the high quality ﬁrm. This proves
that there cannot be an equilibrium in pure strategies where pH > cH .
Consider now the case pH = cH which entails ΠH = 0. The best response of ﬁrm L is to sell to consumers
θ ∈
[
cH−cL
sH−sL , b
]
at unit cost cL. If ﬁrm H deviates by choosing pH = cH +
1
2 [b(sH−sL)− (cH−cL)] > cH , the
consumer who is indiﬀerent between high quality sold at pH and low quality sold at unit cost must have a
preference parameter θ = pH−cLsH−sL =
1
2 [b+
cH−cL
sH−sL ]. Post deviation, the H ﬁrm earns ΠH =
1
b (pH−cH)(b−θ) >
0. This completes the proof.
Appendix 2: Proof of lemma 1.
1. Deﬁne AH (b) ≡ ΠH(UH , UL) − ΠH(DH , DL) and h(b) ≡ [1 + 12
cH−cL
sH−sL−
cH
sH
b− cH−cLsH−sL
]2. Using Table 1, it
is straightforward to show that signAH (b) = sign[h(b) − (4sH−sL)
2
8s2H
]. Clearly h(b) is positive, continuous
and monotonically decreasing in b for b ≥ cH−cLsH−sL . Also, lim
b→[ cH−cLsH−sL ]
+
h(b) = ∞ and lim
b→∞
h(b) = 1. Because
9
8 <
(4sH−sL)2
8s2H
for all 0 < sL < sH we conclude that there exists a value bH > cH−cLsH−sL such that sign
AH (b) = sign [bH − b].
2. Deﬁne AL (b) ≡ ΠH(UH , UL) − ΠH(DH , DL) and g (b) ≡ −AL(b) bsL . Clearly, sign g (b) = −sign
AL (b) .
Straightforward computation yields g(b) = 12 [
cH−cL
sH−sL − cLsL ][ cHsH − cLsL ] −
4sH(sH−sL)
(4sH−sL)2 [
1
2 (b +
cH−cL
sH−sL ) − cLsL ]2.
Clearly, the function g(b), is continuous and monotonically decreasing in b for b ≥ cH−cLsH−sL . Also, limb→∞g(b) =
−∞ and lim
b→[ cH−cLsH−sL ]
+
g(b) = 12 [
cH−cL
sH−sL − cLsL ][ cHsH − cLsL ] −
4sH(sH−sL)
(4sH−sL)2 [
cH−cL
sH−sL − cLsL ]2. Using [ cH−cLsH−sL − cLsL ] =
20
[ cHsH − cLsL ] sHsH−sL , we obtain sign [g( cH−cLsH−sL )] = sign
[
1− 4sH(sH−sL)(4sH−sL)2 sHsH−sL
]
= sign
[
1− 4s2H(4sH−sL)2
]
, which
is positive because sL < sH entails
4s2H
(4sH−sL)2 <
4
9 . Because g (b) is continuous and monotonically decreasing
in b, we conclude that there exists a bL > cH−cLsH−sL such that sign AL (b) = sign [b− bL]. This completes the
proof.
Appendix 3: Proof of proposition 3
Upon deﬁning z ≡ bL− cH−cLsH−sL and y ≡ bH− cH−cLsH−sL , we can write ΠL(UH , UL) =
4sLsH(sH−sL)
(4sH−sL)2b
[
cH−cL
sH−sL − cLsL + z2
]2
,
ΠH(DH , DL) =
(sH−sL)
2b y
2, and ΠH(UH , UL) =
4s2H(sH−sL)
(4sH−sL)2b
[
1
2
(
cH−cL
sH−sL − cHsH
)
+ y
]2
. Using [ cH−cLsH−sL − cLsL ] =
[ cHsH − cLsL ] sHsH−sL , once again, we write ΠL(DH , DL) = sL2b
[
cH−cL
sH−sL − cLsL
]2
sH−sL
sH
. It is straigthforward to show
that ΠL(DH , DL) = ΠL(DH , DL) for z = 2
[
4sH−sL
2
√
2sH
− 1
] [
cH−cL
sH−sL − cLsL
]
and ΠH(UH , UL) =ΠH(DH , DL) for
y = 12
(
cH−cL
sH−sL−
cH
sH
)
4sH−sL
2
√
2sH
−1 . Clearly sign (bH − bL) = sign(y− z) . Therefore a prisoner’s dilemma exists if and only
if y > x.This condition is satisﬁed when 4
[
4sH−sL
2
√
2sH
− 1
]2
< sLsH or 1.25s
2
H − 4.24sLsH + s2L < 0. The latter
condition is met for sH < 3.17sL. This completes the proof.
Appendix 4: Equilibria under diﬀerent regimes when the distribution of preferences is
uniform
We ﬁrst show the derivation of proﬁts shown in Table 1. Then we use a numerical example to illustrate
when the prisoner’s dilemma arises.We denote by pjki (θ) the price targeted at consumer θ by the ﬁrm
producing quality i ∈ {H,L} when it chooses policy j ∈ {D,U} and its rival chooses k ∈ {D,U} .
REGIME (UH , DL)
The best response of the L-ﬁrm to a commitment by the H-ﬁrm is given by (11) in the text The proﬁt
of the H-ﬁrm is then
ΠH(UH , DL) =
1
b
[pH − cH ][b− pH − cL
sH − sL ]
It attains a maximimum for
pUH ,DLH =
1
2
[cH + cL + b(sH − sL)]
implying
ΠH(UH , DL) =
1
2b
[cL − cH + b (sH − sL)]
[
b− 1
2
(
cH − cL
sH − sL + b
)]
=
sH − sL
4b
[b− cH − cL
sH − sL ]
2
Note that b > cH−cLsH−sL entails p
UH ,DL
H > cH . Substitution of p
UH ,DL
H into (11) yields
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pUH ,DLL (θ) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
cL for θ ≥ 12
[
cH−cL
sH−sL + b
]
cH+cL+(b−2θ)(sH−sL)
2 for
1
2
cH+cL+b(sH−sL)
sH
< θ < 12 [
cH−cL
sH−sL + b]
θsL for
cL
sL
≤ θ ≤ 12 cH+cL+b(sH−sL)sH
The total number of units sold by the L-ﬁrm is1b
(
1
2 [
cH−cL
sH−sL + b]− cLsL
)
. The low quality buyer who pays the
highest price has θ = 12
cH+cL+b(sH−sL)
sH
, and pays cH+cL+b(sH−sL)2 − cH+cL+b(sH−sL)2sH (sH−sL) =
cH+cL+b(sH−sL)
2
sl
sH
.
The proﬁt earned from that consumer is
(
cH−cL+2cL+b(sH−sL)
2sH
)
sL−cL = (sH−sL)2 sLsH
(
b + cH−cLsH−sL
)
+ sLsH cL−
cL =
(sH−sL)
2
sL
sH
(
b + cH−cLsH−sL
)
− (sH−sL)sH cL =
sL(sH−sL)
sH
[
1
2
(
b + cH−cLsH−sL
)
− cLsL
]
. Because the distribution of
θ′s is uniform, the average proﬁt per unit sold by the L-ﬁrm is half that amount. Therefore, ΠL= 12b
sL(sH−sL)
sH
[ 12 (b+
cH−cL
sH−sL )− cLsL ]2
REGIME (DH , UL)
When the L−commits to a uniform price pL ∈]cL, cH [, the H-ﬁrm responds by choosing (16). The proﬁt
of the L− ﬁrm is
ΠL(DH , UL) =
1
b
[pL − cL][cH − pL
sH − sL −
pL
sL
]
It attains a maximum for
pDH ,ULL =
1
2
[
cL +
sL
sH
cH
]
=
sL
2
[
cH
sH
+
cL
sL
]
.
implying pDH ,ULL − cL = sL2
[
cH
sH
− cLsL
]
. Also, cH−pLsH−sL =
2cH−cL− sLsH cH
sH−sL =
1
2
(
cH−cL
sH−sL +
cH
sH
)
, and p
DH,UL
L
sL
=
1
2 (
cL
sL
+ cHsH ). Because sL < sH , it must be true that p
DH ,UL
L ∈]cL, cH [.Therefore the proﬁt of the L-ﬁrm is
ΠL = 1b
sL
2
[
cH
sH
− cLsL
] [
1
2
(
cH−cL
sH−sL +
cH
sH
)
− 12 ( cLsL + cHsH )
]
= sL4b
[
cH
sH
− cLsL
] [
cH−cL
sH−sL − cLsL
]
.The market segment
served by the H-ﬁrm is b − cH−pLsH−sL = b −
2cH−−cL− sLsH cH
2(sH−sL) = b −
cH−−cL+(1− sLsH )cH
2(sH−sL) = b − 12
[
cH−cL
sH−sL +
cH
sH
]
.
Substitution of pDH ,ULL into (16) yields :
pDH ,ULH (θ) =
⎧⎨⎩
1
2
[
cL + sLsH cH
]
+ θ(sH − sL) for 12
[
cH−cL
sH−sL +
cH
sH
]
≤ θ ≤ b
cH for θ <
1
2
[
cH−cL
sH−sL +
cH
sH
]
The average proﬁt margin of the H-ﬁrm over the segment it serves is 12
(
pDH ,ULH (b)− cH
)
= 12
[
1
2
(
cL + sLsH cH
)
+ b (sH −
sH−sL
2
[
b− cH−cL2(sH−sL) − sH−sL2(sH−sL) cHsH
]
= sH−sL2
[
b− 12
(
cH−cL
(sH−sL) +
cH
sH
)]
. Thus, the proﬁt of the H-ﬁrm isΠH(DH , UL) =
sH−sL
2b
[
b− 12
(
cH−cL
(sH−sL) +
cH
sH
)]2
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2. When pL ≥ cH . theH−ﬁrm sells to all consumers with θ ∈
[
cH
sH
, b
]
for a price pH(θ) = θsH . No
consumer with θ ∈
[
cL
sL
, cHsH
]
is willing to purchase low quality product at the uniform price pL ≥ cH . More
pointedly, when pL ≥ cH , the high quality producer has a monopoly position and the low quality producer
has no market at all. Therefore, choosing pL ≥ cH is never rational on the part of a leader who produces the
low quality.
REGIME(UH , UL)
This is the standard case examined in the literature18. The proﬁts are
ΠH(pH , pL) =
1
b
(pH − cH)(b− pH − pL
sH − sL )
ΠL(pH , pL) =
1
b
(pL − cL)(pH − pL
sH − sL −
pL
cL
)
Simultaneous choice of prices yields
pUH ,ULH =
sH
4sH − sL [2b(sH − sL) + 2cH + cL]
pUH ,ULL =
1
4sH − sL [bsL(sH − sL) + 2cLsH + cHsL]
Substitution into the proﬁt function yields the proﬁts that appear in Table 1.
REGIME (DH , DL)
The proﬁts appearing in Table 1 are simply obtained by substitution of (7) and (8) into (6), with f (θ) = 1b
for all θ ∈ [0, b]
EXISTENCE OF A PRISONER’S DILEMMA: a NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
Take sL = 1, cL = 1, sH = 2, cH = 4 and note that these values satisfy condition (2), and that sHsL < 3.17
(see proposition 3). In order to check whether a prisonner’s dilemma occurs, we consider two diﬀerent values
of b, speciﬁcally b1 = 4 and b2 = 8. We easily check that b1 ∈ [bL, bH ] and b2 > bH , where bL and bH are
the thresholds deﬁned in the lemma
When b1 = 4, we ﬁnd that
1) pUH ,DLH =
9
2and p
UH ,DL
L (θ, pH) =
⎧⎨⎩
1 for θ ∈ [72 , 4]
9
2 − θ for θ ∈] 134 , 72 [
θ for θ ∈ [1, 134 ] implying, ΠH(UH , DL) =
1
16 and
ΠL(UH , DL) = 2564
2) pDH ,ULL =
3
2 and p
DH ,UL
H (θ, pL) =
{
3
2 + θ for θ ∈
[
1
2 , 4
]
4 for θ < 12
implying ΠH(DH , UL) = 932 and
ΠL(DH , UL) = 216
18Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979), Shaked and Sutton (1982), Moorthy (1988, 1991).
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3) pDH ,DLH (θ) =
{
1 + θ for θ ∈ [3, 4]
4 for θ < 3 and p
DH ,DL
L (θ) =
⎧⎨⎩
1 for θ ∈ [3, 4]
4− θ for θ ∈]2, 3[
θ for θ ∈ [1, 2]
implying ΠH(DH , DL) =
1
8 and ΠL(DH , DL) =
2
8
4) pUH ,ULH =
34
7 and p
UH ,UL
L =
12
7 implying ΠH(UH , UL) =
9
49 and ΠL(UH , UL) =
25
98 ,
When b2 = 8, we ﬁnd that
1) pUH ,DLH =
13
2 and p
UH ,DL
L (θ, pH) =
⎧⎨⎩
1 for θ ∈ [ 112 , 8]
13
2 − θ for θ ∈] 94 , 112 [
θ for θ ∈ [1, 94] implying ΠH(UH , DL) =
25
32 and
ΠL(UH , DL) = 81256
2) pDH ,ULL =
3
2 and p
DH ,UL
H (θ, pL) =
{
3
2 + θ for θ ∈
[
5
2 , 8
]
4 for θ < 52
implying ΠH(DH , UL) = 12132 and
ΠL(DH , UL) = 232
3) pDH ,DLH (θ) =
{
1 + θ for θ ∈ [3, 8]
4 for θ < 3 and p
DH ,DL
L (θ) =
⎧⎨⎩
1 for θ ∈ [3, 8]
4− θ for θ ∈]2, 3[
θ for θ ∈ [1, 2]
implying ΠH(DH , DL) =
25
16 and ΠL(DH , DL) =
2
16
4) pUH ,ULH =
50
7 and p
UH ,UL
L =
16
7 implying ΠH(UH , UL) =
242
196 and ΠL(UH , UL) =
121
196
We note that the regime (DH , DL) is an equilibrium in dominant strategies for b = b1 as well as for
b = b2. We also observe that this equilibrium is Pareto-dominated by the (UH , UL) regime when b = b1and
is not dominated when b = b2 .
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